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ABSTRACT. Legal and political controversies persist about the performance of
Kelsenian-type constitutional courts in democratic systems. One of the reasons is
that the design of these institutions cannot easily accommodate simultaneous but
conflicting demands for the strong protection of democracy and human rights,
judicial independence and constitutional restraint. Challenging the dominant ap-
proach to the design of contemporary constitutional courts, this article proposes a
new way to balance these three values through reforms to the structure of
Kelsenian institutions. The proposal seeks to institutionalize constitutional re-
straint, embedding it into courts’ internal functioning rules while, concurrently,
emancipating constitutional judges from political control through a reform of
appointment procedures. It is argued that the combined effects of these two
reforms will produce constitutional courts that are more independent and able to
protect the core elements of a democratic political community while, at the same
time, increasing constitutional deference to the democratically elected legislator.
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional courts are today recognized as central institutions in
democracies all over the world. Where they exist, they are often
seen as the ultimate guarantee for the protection of the democratic
system of government and the culture of human rights that lies at
the core of liberal political communities. In addition, however, de-
spite the high purposes they serve, constitutional courts are often
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surrounded by controversy and criticisms. Constitutional courts are
frequently dismissed as politicized institutions that simply follow the
instructions of their appointers.1 At other times, constitutional judges
are accused of being activists that pursue their own policy goals
under the guise of defending the constitution.2 Courts entrusted with
powers of constitutional review have even been accused of being
inefficient and unfit for their very purpose of defending human rights
or democracy.3 All these criticisms are different and, to some extent,
contradict each other, but all of them have damaging effects on the
prestige and reputation of these institutions.
Constitutional courts can be defined as judicial-type organs that,
in a political system, have a monopoly on the assessment of the
constitutionality of legislation and the power to invalidate laws and
statutes that do not conform to the constitution. In this regard, they
are central to the idea of ‘neo constitutionalism’.4 They are often
called ‘Kelsenian courts’ because they follow the model of the
Austrian Constitution of 1920 in whose creation the eminent jurist
Hans Kelsen had a prominent role. As an alternative to the US model
of diffuse review, Kelsen’s original idea was for a court that could
ensure the uniformity of the assessment of the constitutionality of
statutes through a monopoly on this activity.5 In the original Aus-
trian model, legislation declared unconstitutional was generally
invalidated erga omnes and ex nunc.6
This article reflects on the design of constitutional courts and on
their role in contemporary democracies. It aims at deeply recon-
1 Francesc de Carreras Serra, ‘The Inevitable Jurisprudential Construction of the Autonomous State’,
in Alberto López Basaguren and Leire Escajedo San Epifanio (eds.), The Ways of Federalism in Western
Countries and the Horizons of Territorial Autonomy in Spain: Volume 1 (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2013),
pp. 481–500, 492; Pablo José Castillo Ortiz, ‘Framing the Court: Political Reactions to the Ruling on the
Declaration of Sovereignty of the Catalan Parliament’, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 7(1) (2015): pp.
27–47.
2 Arthur Dyevre, ‘Unifying the Field of Comparative Judicial Politics: Towards a General Theory of
Judicial Behaviour’, European Political Science Review 2(2) (2010): pp. 297–327, 320.
3 See Rosenberg, Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change? (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008); Richard Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Constitution: Why Europeans
should Avoid American Style Constitutional Judicial Review’, European Political Science 7(1) (2008): pp.
9–20, 17.
4 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutions and Judicial Power’, in Daniele Caramani (eds.), Comparative
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 217–239, 221.
5 Hans Kelsen, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the
American Constitution’, The Journal of Politics 4(2) (1942): pp. 183–200, 185.
6 Ibid., p.186. As Kelsen puts later on in that article, the only exception to the lack of retroactive
force of declarations of unconstitutionality refers precisely to the case that originated the review of
constitutionality (p. 187).
PABLO CASTILLO-ORTIZ618
ceptualizing the way in which we theorize and design these insti-
tutions. To do so, I will undertake a double task. First, I will provide
a novel theoretical framework aimed at understanding constitutional
courts, which reveals that these institutions are subject to inherent
tensions of design. Second, building on that theoretical framework,
the article proposes a new type of constitutional court, which aims at
helping constitution makers minimize inherent trade-offs of institu-
tional design. Far from a mere academic exercise, the proposal aims
at being applied to real world cases.
Let me analyze these two aspects separately and in greater detail.
The first task has to do with the construction of a new theoretical
framework to understand constitutional courts. As Pasquino puts it,
‘a theory of democracy should also be nowadays a theory of con-
stitutional democracy. That means, it should analyse and compare
different modalities of constitutional control and try to exhibit the
rationale –alternatively the lack of rationale- of those institutions’.7
As is generally the case with political institutions,8 this article shows
that designing constitutional courts often involves choosing between
conflicting values. Focusing on constitutional courts’ function of the
constitutional review of legislation, it is argued that these institutions
are simultaneously expected to be good defenders of democracy and
human rights, to be independent from political actors and to avoid
judicial activism through self-restraint. Furthermore, it is argued that
the problem with these three values is that it is not possible to
completely maximize all of them at the same time. For that reason,
we must see constitutional courts as subject to a constitutive tension:
their design involves unavoidable trade-offs because, in order to
maximize certain institutional values, other values must –at least
partially, give way.9
The most immediate consequence of this tension is that it is
logically impossible to design a perfect constitutional court. Kelse-
nian-type courts will always be subject to criticism simply because
the trade-offs they face prevent them from completely maximizing
one or another valuable political good, therefore creating constantly
7 Pasquale Pasquino, ‘Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy. Comparative Perspectives: USA,
France, Italy’, Ratio Juris 11(1) (1998): pp. 38–50, 41.
8 See Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 10.
9 See Nuno Garoupa, ‘Empirical Legal Studies and Constitutional Courts’, Indian Journal of Consti-
tutional Law 5(1) (2011): pp. 26–54, 28–29.
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unmet social and political demands. Nevertheless, knowledge of
those trade-offs can help us improve this design. This brings me to
the second task undertaken by this article: the proposal for a new
design of constitutional courts. In this regard, it is argued that we
should give up on the ambitious but impossible task of designing
constitutional courts that maximize all three values at the same time.
Instead, I argue that we should focus on the more modest but also
more realistic objective of finding the optimal proportion of those
values and embed it into the institutional design of constitutional
courts. Furthermore, I argue that such an optimal proportion may lie
in a design that departs from the contemporary dominant model of
constitutional courts. In my proposal, I suggest that we should
consider limiting the power of constitutional courts, albeit only with
regard to aspects that are not essential to the protection of a
democratic political system. In exchange, I argue that constitutional
courts should be given more independence from political actors.
While I do not suggest that all currently existing constitutional
courts should immediately adopt this model, I believe that this
proposal might be useful in countries currently without a system of
review but that are considering its implementation or in those
countries in which such a system exists, but it is dysfunctional or
lacks sociological legitimacy.
This article is structured as follows. I begin by reflecting on the
three aforementioned values that constitutional courts are expected
to maximize and show that the failure to uphold each of them is
problematic from the perspective of the legitimacy of these institu-
tions, creating reputational costs. Next, I will explain why, despite
the fact that all three of the values are important, they cannot be
simultaneously maximized, setting a dilemma for any attempt to
design a Kelsenian court. Subsequently, I will present my proposal
for a new approach to the institutional design of constitutional
courts. While, in my view, no design can eliminate the constitutive
tension of constitutional courts, I believe the proposal presented in
this article is a good way to mediate among those conflicting values
and to create, not ‘perfect’ constitutional courts but ‘good imperfect’
ones. In the following section, I will emphasize the configurational,
context-specific nature of institutional designs, and I will reflect on
how each of the elements of my proposal may interact with the
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wider constitutional and sociopolitical context of the courts. Subse-
quently, I will devote some discussion to the problem of illiberalism
and its relationship with constitutional courts, analyzing it with the
help of the theoretical framework advanced by this article. The last
section concludes.
II. THE VALUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
There are three main values or goods that justify the existence and
design of constitutional courts. Most academic and social discussions
about the merits of Kelsenian courts gravitate around the performance
of these institutions vis-à-vis these values. These values are the pro-
tection of democracy and human rights, judicial independence and
constitutional restraint. While I do not claim that these values are the
only ones that matter for Kelsenian-type constitutional courts, I will
demonstrate that justifications of these institutions typically deal with
the maximization of at least these three goods: constitutional courts
are deemed to be desirable, well-designed institutions insofar as they
realize these three values. At the same time, these values are linked to
general principles of liberal constitutionalism. Judicial independence is
linked to the principle of the rule of law, because the ideal of the rule
of law can only be realized through independent courts. Constitu-
tional restraint is linked to the democratic principle, because in
exhibiting self-restraint vis-à-vis the parliament constitutional courts
allow a democratically elected actor to make the most important
policy decisions. And protection of democracy and human rights is
linked to the general preservation of liberal constitutionalism, because
liberal constitutionalism has political freedom at its core.
Therefore, the judicial values of independence, restraint and
protection of democracy and human rights have implications for
liberal constitutionalism in general. Hence their importance. Fur-
thermore, when constitutional courts fail to uphold any of these
judicial values, it usually results in important reputational costs for
them. In the next lines, each of these values is explored in detail.
A. The Protection of Democracy and Human Rights
The literatures on law and politics generally agree that the protec-
tion of democracy and human rights is the central aim of postwar
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constitutional courts. As was put correctly by Stone Sweet, ‘con-
temporary Kelsenians claim that constitutional courts function to
protect constitutional rights, and that this function is basic to the
legitimacy of review’.10 In this regard, constitutional courts do not
only perform judicial review, but also they are bestowed with
judicial supremacy: unlike in the ‘new Commonwealth model of
constitutionalism’,11 in enforcing the constitution to protect
democracy and human rights constitutional courts can strike down
decisions of the parliament with effects erga omnes. Constitutional
courts, and not legislatures, have the final word.12
The idea of the judicial enforceability of human rights and the
protection of democratic institutions by constitutional courts has
much to do with the moral dimension of the catastrophes of the 20th
century. Kelsenian courts spread in postwar Europe against the
background of totalitarian experiences and massive violations of
human rights and with an aim of avoiding the repetition of these
horrors in the future.13 Very often, the protection of democracy and
human rights in these new-born, fragile liberal polities was one the
reasons that justified the creation of constitutional courts. The best
example, precisely because of its dark historical background, is that
of Germany. According to Schoenberger, the ‘new significance of
human rights after Nazism’ was one of the main reasons behind the
creation of the Federal Constitutional Court:
The Parliamentary Council started its document with a proclamation of human dignity and a
catalogue of human rights… Theirs was a string reaction to the Nazi period. And they wanted
not only to proclaim fundamental rights, but to make them judicially enforceable… They cared
less for the problem of the delicate balance between Parliament and the new Court than for the
clean and unequivocal break with the Nazi experience.14
10 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’ West European Politics
25(1) (2002), pp.77–100, 82. See also Arthur Dyevre, ‘Technocracy and Distrust: Revisiting the Rationale
for Constitutional Review’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 13(1) (2015): pp. 30–60, 36–37.
11 See on this Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013).
12 See Stephen Gardbaum, ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’, American Journal
of Comparative Law 49 (2001): pp. 707–760, 709.
13 Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Separation of Powers and the Growth of Judicial Review in Established
Democracies (or Why Has the Model of Legislative Supremacy Mostly Been Withdrawn From Sale?)’,
American Journal of Comparative Law 62(3) (2014): pp. 613–39, 614.
14 Schoenberger Christoph, ‘The Establishment of Judicial Review in Postwar Germany’, in Pasquale
Pasquino and Francesca Billi (eds.), The Political Origins of Constitutional Courts (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley
Law, 2009), pp. 76–83.
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The protection of democracy and human rights is, therefore, the
first of the three values that constitutional courts should seek to
maximize. Furthermore, this article defends the idea that, when
balancing the protection of democracy and fundamental rights
against the other two values of constitutional courts (judicial inde-
pendence and judicial restraint), the former should be given a special
weighting. For this reason, when proposing reforms of the design of
constitutional courts, this article will only put forward those that are
compatible with the maximum possible protection of democratic
arrangements and human rights. There are two types of reasons for
this approach: theoretical and practical.
At the theoretical level, the importance of fundamental rights in
contemporary legal constitutionalism seems uncontested. Jürgen
Habermas argued that, rather than as a constraint on democracy,
‘basic rights as a whole and not merely political rights, are consti-
tutive for the process of self-legislation’.15 In Dworkin’s well-known
theory, ‘rights are best understood as trumps over some background
justification for political decisions that states a goal for the com-
munity as a whole’.16 At the core of Dworkin’s approach, there is
thus a clear statement about the prevalent character of the defense of
fundamental rights in a liberal polity. Finally, according to Alexy,
fundamental rights should be treated as ‘optimization requirements,
that is, as principles, not simply as rules. As optimization require-
ments, principles are norms requiring that something be realized to
the greatest extent possible’.17 In the writings of all of these authors,
what we find is a defense of the character of fundamental rights as a
central feature of constitutionalism. Furthermore, there is a corollary
to these approaches to fundamental rights: other values, such as
deference to the legislature, must be at least partially subordinated to
an adequate protection of fundamental rights.
At the practical level, in the era of illiberal populism, institutional
defenses of human rights and democratic arrangements, such as
those afforded by Kelsenian courts, are probably more necessary
than ever. Even an opponent of constitutional review such as Jeremy
15 JüRgen Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?’,
Political Theory 29(6) (2001): pp. 766–781, 776.
16 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’, in Jeremy Waldron (eds.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984), pp. 153–167, 153.
17 Robert Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’, International Journal of
Constitutional Law 3(4) (2005): pp. 572–581, 572–573.
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Waldron admits that his case against this arrangement is dependent
on one premise: the existence of stable, properly functioning
democracies with societies committed to the rights of individuals and
minorities.18 The issue is that the current époque demonstrates that
such a premise can no longer be taken for granted. No society,
whatever the strength or age of her democracy, seems to be immune
to the eventual rise of illiberalism. From the perspective of the first
of their values, constitutional courts can be understood as insurance
mechanisms against those situations.
The countermodel of the protective constitutional court is the ‘in-
efficient court’: a court that is unable to protect democracy and human
rights against authoritarian politicians. To illustrate this, we can think
about the traditional understanding of courts under authoritarian or
semi-authoritarian regimes. According to Ginsburg and Versteeg, ‘when
autocrats expect that they will be able to control the court, constitu-
tional review might boost the regime’s international reputation without
imposing any real costs’.19 Recent literature on judicial politics provides
for a very nuanced understanding of courts in authoritarian contexts,
where these can be instruments of repression but also sites of active
resistance.20 Such courts can be used to decimate the opposition and to
consolidate the ruling coalition of power, but they can also open ave-
nues for the political opposition to challenge the regime.21 Nevertheless,
constitutional courts in such contexts are very frequently unable to
sufficiently maximize the value of the protection of the democratic
order. A good example of this is the current Russian Constitutional
Court, which has been unable to prevent the Russian Federation from
consolidating a semi-authoritarian regime. As explained by Valor, the
current Constitutional Court of Russia is strongly supportive of the
Russian government and its political machinery, having upheld the
constitutionality of democratically regressive legislation.22 Cases such as
this very clearly demonstrate the importance of the connection between
the value of the protection of democracy and human rights and the
18 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’, The Yale Law Journal 115(6)
(2006): pp. 1346–1406.
19 Tom Ginsburg and Mila Versteeg, ‘Why do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?’, Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization 30(3) (2014): pp. 587–622, 610.
20 Tamir Moustafa, ‘Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes’, Annual Review of Law and Social
Science 10(1) (2014): pp. 281–299, 282.
21 Ibid., pp. 281–299.
22 Ozan O. Varol, ‘Stealth Authoritarianism’, Iowa Law Review 100 (2015): pp. 1673–1742, 1689–1690.
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value of judicial independence, which will be dealt with in the next
subsection. The Russian Constitutional Court is doubtlessly deferent to
the political branches of government, especially the executive. How-
ever, this happens at the cost of losing its institutional independence,
and precisely for this reason, the court is largely unable to protect
democracy in its country.
B. Judicial Independence
The second value that a constitutional court’s design should ideally
maximize is independence. In this context, judicial independence refers
to the capacity of a court to solve disputes ‘without regard to the power
and preference of the parties appearing before it, including those of the
legislative and executive branches of government’.23 In fact, judicial
independence can be deemed a continuum. In one extreme, we would
find totally independent courts whose process of decision making is
absolutely free from external influences. In the opposite extreme of the
continuum, we would find judicial institutions that completely submit
to the will of other actors, often political actors, and with no agency of
their own. Empirically, existing courts are located in a range of inter-
mediate positions within that continuum.
Judicial independence is deemed to be a precondition for any
polity based on the rule of law.24 Victor Ferreres rightly points to
how ordinary courts obtain legitimacy from the idea that they are
independent law adjudicators:
ordinary courts are strongly linked to rule of law values. They act as impartial third parties… To
the extent that people view ordinary courts as independent institutions, they are more likely to
support them and to be critical of efforts that undermine their independence.25
Judicial independence is also of the utmost importance for insti-
tutions performing constitutional review of legislation. For Tridimas,
constitutional review of policies is ‘only meaningful when conducted
23 George Tridimas, ‘Constitutional Judicial Review and Political Insurance’, European Journal of Law
and Economics 29(1) (2010): pp. 81–101, 85.
24 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight and Olga Shvetsova, ‘The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Estab-
lishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government’, Law & Society Review 35(1) (2001):
pp. 117–164, 117.
25 V Ferreres Comella, ‘The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court:
Some Thoughts on Judicial Activism’ (2004)’, Texas Law Review 82 (2003–2004): pp. 1705–1736, 1728.
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by an independent court’.26 According to Kyritsis, it is precisely by
virtue of their independence that courts are good candidates to
perform the task of legislative supervision.27 Constitutional courts
are deemed legitimate when they can claim that their decisions are
the result of the independent and neutral application of the consti-
tution.28 Furthermore, the more independent constitutional courts
are, the more they will able be to protect democracy and human
rights when these are attacked by political actors.
However, despite its important role in legitimizing these institu-
tions, the independence of constitutional courts is often questioned.
As put by Ferreres:
Constitutional courts, in contrast [to ordinary courts], are relatively new institutions, and they
are not purely ‘judicial’: they specialize in politically sensitive issues, their members are usually
selected in a more political manner, and sometimes they decide challenges brought by political
institutions. To the extent that constitutional courts appear to be more ‘political’, they cannot
easily draw from the moral capital that ordinary courts may have accumulated as impartial
interpreters and enforcers of law.29
The extreme countermodel of the independent Kelsenian court
would be the ‘politicized court’ or, to put it more bluntly, the ‘puppet
court’. Briefly, the idea behind these depictions would be a constitu-
tional court that is not a neutral, independent adjudicator of the con-
stitution but rather an instrument at the service of the political actors
that have control over it, a court that uses the constitution as an excuse
to implement the preferences of its principals. The idea of a ‘puppet
court’ must be deemed an abstract type rather than an accurate
description of empirical constitutional courts, especially in democra-
cies in which these institutions are subject to political pressures but
simultaneously preserve significant independence. However, the fact
is that it is not unusual for political actors during political debate to use
this depiction of constitutional courts as ‘puppets’ or ‘politicized’
institutions when the courts make decisions against their preferences.
A good example is the recent series of accusations of politicization
against the Spanish Constitutional Court.30 Regardless whether this
26 Tridimas, supra note 23, p. 85.
27 Dimitrios Kyritsis, ‘Constitutional Review in Representative Democracy’, Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 32(2) (2012): pp. 297–324, 303.
28 Castillo Ortiz, supra note 1, p. 31.
29 Comella, supra note 25, p. 1728.
30 Castillo Ortiz, supra note 1, pp. 27–47.
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institution actually lacks sufficient independence or not vis-à-vis
politicians, it is clear that such perceptions among the public is dan-
gerous and detrimental to the reputation of the court. This shows that
Kelsenian courts, like other types of courts, need a modicum of inde-
pendence to be deemed legitimate. The paradox is that, while con-
stitutional courts move necessarily in the arena of politics, their
‘politicization’ usually becomes problematic.
C. Constitutional Restraint
The third value that Kelsenian courts ought to uphold is constitutional
restraint. In the US context, Judge Posner defined constitutional re-
straint as a type of judicial restraint that refers to a judicial reluctance to
declare legislative or executive action unconstitutional, generally based
on an attitude of respect for the elected branches of government.31
Posner provides for a lengthy list of reasons why restraint is indeed a
desirable judicial practice, including inter alia: the unintended conse-
quences of judicial decisions, the weak claims to objective validity in
most constitutional decisions and especially in difficult cases, the vast
scope of the constitution and the limited information available to jud-
ges, as well as the nonlegal factors operating unconsciously in judicial
decision making, such as personal values or peer pressure.32
Beyond these reasons, a very powerful argument in favor of
constitutional restraint has to do with the often tense relationship
between constitutional review and democracy, which can be traced
back to the very creation of this arrangement. Constitutional review
is now a feature of most democratic political systems.33 However,
that was not always the case. As explained by Stone Sweet, ‘prior to
the appearance of the Kelsenian constitutional court, it was widely
assumed that constitutional review was incompatible with parlia-
mentary governance and the unitary state’.34 In countries such as
France, the idea of constitutional review had to fight a long battle
against the pre-existing model of parliamentary sovereignty, which
31 Richard A. Posner, ‘The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint’, California Law Review 100(3)
(2012): pp. 519–556, 521.
32 Ibid., pp. 553–554.
33 See Ginsburg and Versteeg, supra note 19, p.587. See also Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Why Europe
Rejected American Judicial Review: And Why it May not Matter’, Michigan Law Review 101(8) (2003):
pp. 2744–2780.
34 Stone Sweet, supra note 10, p. 78.
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saw the legislature as the democratically legitimate site of law
making and distrusted the excessive power of ‘unelected’ judges to
overturn parliamentary decisions.35
The tension between the democratic legitimacy of the political
branches of government and the power of judicial-type organs to
overturn their decisions still permeates the discussion about consti-
tutional review and fuels criticisms of this arrangement.36 The lit-
erature refers to this tension by calling it the ‘countermajoritarian
difficulty’.37 As noted by Kyritsis, given that in a democracy the
legislature is the main locus of democratic legitimacy,
for many, the fact that constitutional review cuts away the power of the legislature and gives it
to unelected judges is reason to object to it, even if it is true that such a practice better protects
the fundamental rights of citizens.38
This objection is so powerful that it continues to inspire some
empirically existing political systems. Political constitutionalism,
which has as a central tenet the defense of the supremacy of the
legislator,39 is probably still the dominant constitutional theory in the
United Kingdom, a country that provides a prominent example of an
advanced democracy where parliamentary sovereignty has managed
to survive.
In countries where they have been implemented, constitutional
courts are always in the difficult position of trying to defend the
constitution without being accused of supplanting the legislature.
For that reason, even defenders of the idea of constitutional review
often acknowledge that this arrangement should be compatible with
a modicum of deference to elected politicians. According to Kyritsis,
courts reviewing legislation should still respect the legislature.40 He
argues that constitutional review should not overshadow or overly
35 See Gardbaum, supra note 13, p. 628. See also Pasquale Pasquino, ‘Constitutional Adjudication and
Democracy. Comparative Perspectives: USA, France, Italy’, Ratio Juris 11(1) (2002): pp. 38–50, 45.
36 See Waldron, supra note 18, pp. 1346–1406.
37 See Or Bassok and Yoav Dotan, ‘Solving the Countermajoritarian Difficulty?’, International Journal
of Constitutional Law 11(1) (2013): pp. 13–33.
38 Kyritsis, supra note 27, p. 297.
39 See Graham Gee and Gregoire Webber, ‘What Is a Political Constitution?’, Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 30(2) (2010): pp. 273–299; Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2007); Richard Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Constitution: Why Europeans should Avoid
American Style Constitutional Judicial Review’, European Political Science 7(1) (2008): pp. 9–20.
40 Kyritsis, supra note 27, p. 299.
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obstruct the role reserved to the legislature,; rather, it should have a
subsidiary character.41
The countermodel of the constitutionally restrained court is
probably best reflected by the idea of the ‘gouvernement des juges’, to
borrow the title of Lambert’s famous work.42 In his book, the French
academic expressed fear that judges would use their powers of re-
view to advance their own policy goals, which he denounced as
reactionary at that time.43 Note that, according to some authors, a
modicum of activism is an intrinsic part of Kelsenian courts.44
Constitutional courts are expected to be ‘active’ in the defense of the
constitution against unconstitutional legislation passed by the par-
liament. However, such activism can become excessive in a hypo-
thetical situation in which constitutional judges displace
democratically elected decision makers by using the constitutional
text as an excuse to advance their personal policy preferences.45 We
can call this ‘pathological activism’. The question is, therefore, where
is the boundary that separates legitimate judicial behavior from
pathological activism. For political constitutionalists, any judicial
enforcement of the constitution against the will of the democratically
legislature is generally unacceptable.46 In contrast, neo-constitu-
tionalists consider constitutional review of legislation a necessary
part of democracy, but as argued above, even within these postu-
lates, judicial restraint and deference to the legislature are desirable.
Indeed, when constitutional courts are, in real polities, accused of
‘activism’, the criticism often refers to what I have called patholog-
ical activism. Furthermore, such an accusation shows that constitu-
tional restraint and deference to democratically elected political
actors is a social and political expectation of Kelsenian institutions.
41 Ibid., p. 318.
42 Édouard Lambert, Le Gouvernement des Juges et la Lutte Contre la Législation Sociale Aux États-Unis:
L’expérience Américaine du Contrôle Judiciaire de la Constitutionnalité des Lois (Paris: Marcel Giard & Cie,
1921).
43 Although Lambert’s critique was mainly addressed to the American model of diffuse judicial
review and its introduction in France. See Stone Sweet, supra note 33, p. 2759.
44 Comella, supra note 25: pp. 1705–1736.
45 See Garoupa, supra note 9, pp. 34–35.
46 Gee and Webber, supra note 39, p. 288.
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III. THE THREE VALUES AND KELSENIAN COURTS’ INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN
In the previous section, I argued that there are at least three values
that all Kelsenian courts should aim to maximize simultaneously:
strong protection of democracy and human rights, judicial inde-
pendence and restraint vis-à-vis democratically legitimized policy
makers. In this section, I argue that the problem with these three
values is that, in fact, they might not always be compatible with each
other. As I will show, there seems to be a strong tension underlying
the relationship between them. At a theoretical level, the simulta-
neous maximization of the protection of the democratic constitution
and of judicial independence seem conceptually possible. It is plau-
sible to imagine a constitutional court endowed with great powers to
protect democratic institutions and human rights, as outlined by the
constitution, and to conceptualize such a court as removed from all
possible control by political actors. However, in order to realize
these two values together, the third value, constitutional restraint or
deference, must give way, at least partially.
In fact, each of the first two values is autonomously in tension
with the third. The defense of the constitution as a higher rule
entrenching democracy and human rights is in tension with the idea
of deference. As put by Ferreres in his reading of Alexy, ‘if the
constitution covers so much terrain, and the constitutional court is
the supreme interpreter of the constitution, what is left for the
democratic branches to do?’47 That is, the wider the range of tools
that are available to the constitutional court to protect the consti-
tution, the wider the range of opportunities there are to issue
countermajoritarian decisions and to be activist. Independence is also
in tension with deference and restraint because constitutional judges
removed from political control are more likely to challenge the
preferences of elected politicians.48 Constitutional judges removed
from all political control will have little to fear when they overturn
democratically legitimized policy choices, and such challenges will
become more frequent. Furthermore, if the protection of democracy
47 Comella, supra note 25, p. 1735. See also Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, ‘Constitutional Courts and
Democracy. Facets of an Ambivalent Relationship’, in Klaus Meßerschmidt and A. Daniel Oliver-Lalana
(eds.), Rational Lawmaking under Review: Legisprudence According to the German Federal Constitutional Court
(Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), pp. 19–32, 26.
48 See Garoupa, supra note 9, p. 29, c.f., see Comella, supra note 25, p. 1733.
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and independence are each autonomously in tension with the ideas
of deference and restraint, when they combine, such tensions in-
crease exponentially. Courts with a wide range of tools to protect the
constitution and emancipated from political control would be more
prone to engage in countermajoritarian decisions and to more often
challenge the preferences of elected politicians. As the constitutional
text would provide a wide cloak for judicial action, very independent
constitutional courts would increasingly become a veto point and
would contest the policy choices of the political branches of gov-
ernment. By maximizing the protection of the constitution and
judicial independence simultaneously, constitutional restraint is
minimized.
In this regard, it is important to underline that this tension is not
the product of the inefficient institutional design of constitutional
courts. It is in fact inherent to the very essential elements of
Kelsenian-type constitutional review, possibly of constitutional re-
view in general, and to the conceptual relation among the three
values that constitutional courts are expected to maximize. Institu-
tional design can provide, for better or worse, a balancing among
those values, but no design will ever be able to entirely overcome
the intrinsic tension among them. In fact, variations in the designs of
constitutional courts over time and space can be read as variations in
the approaches to the balancing of those values and to the man-
agement of the tensions among them. In the next two subsections, I
will analyze this point, focusing first in Kelsen’s original model of a
constitutional court and then on the type of constitutional courts
that became dominant in postwar Europe.
A. Kelsen’s Original Court: Restricted Powers with Political Legitimation
Kelsen’s view was that, in his time, there were ‘very poor’ guaran-
tees of the constitutionality of statutes.49 The idea to create a con-
stitutional court must be explained as a reaction to this political-
constitutional background. In his definition, a constitutional court
was ‘an organ that is distinct from the legislator and independent of
it, and thus of any other public authority, [which] must be
49 Hans Kelsen, ‘Kelsen on the nature and development of constitutional adjudication’, in Lars Vinx
(eds.), The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2015[1929]), pp. 22–78, 25.
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empowered to annul the unconstitutional acts of the legislator’.50
However, beyond this basic definition, Kelsen’s original design of
constitutional courts provided for an interesting institutional setup
that involved a very specific combination of the three values outlined
above. This is so for at least two reasons.
First, Kelsen’s original idea was for a court that would enforce
mostly constitutional procedural rules but not fundamental rights or
substantive provisions. According to Stone Sweet,
Kelsen argued that constitutions should not contain human rights, which he associated with
natural law, due to their open-ended nature… Adjudicating rights claims, in his view, would
inevitably weaken positivism’s hold on judges, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the
judiciary itself, since judges would become the lawmakers.51
In a way, Kelsen seemed to fear the increase in judicial activism
that the enforcement of fundamental rights might cause.52
Second, Kelsen’s original design included appointment procedure
for constitutional judges that was totally under the control of
political actors. In his time, Kelsen faced politicians that were sus-
picious of judicial power.53 The Austrian Constitution of 1920
explicitly included the parliamentary appointment of members of the
constitutional court. As put by Kelsen,
Since the Constitution conferred upon the Constitutional Court a legislative function, i.e. a
function which, in principle, was reserved to the Parliament, the Austrian Constitution of 1920,
provided that the members of the Constitutional Court had to be elected by the Parliament and
not like other judges, to be appointed by the administration… This way of constituting the
Court was accepted in order to make the Court as independent as possible from the adminis-
tration. This independence was necessary because the Court had the control over different acts
of the administration… By a misuse of this power the administration could easily supress the
parliament and thus eliminate the democratic basis of the State.54
Note that this passage combines two ideas. On the one hand, the
parliamentary appointment of members of the court was necessary
because, after all, the court would perform legislative functions. On
the other hand, it was appropriate because the alternative was
appointment by members by the administration, which could
50 Kelsen, The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional
Law, at p. 45.
51 Stone Sweet, supra note 33, pp. 2767–2768. See also Stone Sweet, supra note 10, pp. 81–82.
52 See also Hans Kelsen ’La garantie jurisdictionnelle de la Constitution (la Justice constitutionnelle)’,
Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et à l’étranger, 45 (1928), pp. 197–257, 241.
53 Stone Sweet, supra note 33, p. 2766.
54 Kelsen, supra note 5, p. 188.
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threaten the democratic functioning of the state. I will return to this
tension between parliamentary and administrative appointments la-
ter in this article.
If we keep in mind the three values of constitutional courts
outlined earlier in this article, what we find in Kelsens original
design is an interesting combination: a constitutional court with only
moderate powers of review and not very insulated from political
actors. Given its range of powers, we can say that the original
Kelsenian institutions were clearly less powerful than most con-
temporary constitutional courts. In addition, although they were
independent vis-à-vis the administration, they were not independent
vis-à-vis the parliament because this latter institution had control
over the appointment of constitutional judges. Note that this
depiction of the original Kelsenian courts is not intended as criticism
of the design devised by the Austrian jurist; rather, it simply aims at
describing the design. Indeed, the two features of institutional design
identified in this subsection were probably functional to achieve
sensible political-constitutional aims: maximizing the deference of
the court vis-à-vis elected politicians in the legislature, avoiding ‘the
government of judges’55 and minimizing the risk of an activist court.
B. The Postwar Court: Expanding the Range of Powers of the Institution
Contemporary constitutional courts do not fully fit the original de-
sign envisaged by Kelsen. Stone Sweet is right when he suggests that
the destruction of World War II made possible the diffusion of
Kelsenian-type constitutional courts but, paradoxically, only under
the condition that one of the central elements of Kelsen’s original
design was overcome.56 After the horrors of totalitarianisms, con-
stitutional courts are not only now allowed to enforce the funda-
mental rights listed in the constitution, but in fact, that is one of their
main functions. This gives contemporary constitutional courts a
wide range of opportunities to engage in the constitutional review of
legislation, and in this regard, they have become notably more
powerful than they were meant to be in Kelsen’s initial plan.
55 Stone Sweet, supra note 33, p. 2768.
56 Ibid., p. 2769.
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However, the other aspect of Kelsens original idea, the political
appointment of judges, continues to be solidly embedded in the
design of most constitutional courts. In Europe, the mechanism of
the appointment of constitutional judges typically grants political
actors a prominent role.57 In Germany, the legislative chambers
appoint constitutional judges by qualified majorities. Additionally, in
Spain, the government can appoint some of the magistrados. Other
systems do not even require parliamentary supermajorities. An
argument put forward to justify the political appointment of mem-
bers of the court is that it helps overcome the so-called counter-
majoritarian difficulty. As put by Ferreres,
Judicial review of legislation may give rise to a ‘democratic objection’ inasmuch as the legislation
in question is the product of a democratic legislature. This objection may be minimized if the
members of the court are selected in ways that are relatively democratic.58
Again, I believe this idea reflects the tensions among the values of
the constitutional courts that I described earlier: the power to ap-
point constitutional judges is bestowed upon political actors because
of the democratic legitimacy of the latter, but in so doing, the
independence of the court is sacrificed.
The political appointment of members of the constitutional court
soon proved problematic. The independence of constitutional judges
vis-à-vis politicians depends on a number of factors, inter alia the
duration of tenures, the autonomy of the court to manage resources
or the enforceability of its decisions. However, judicial appointments
are crucial in this regard. Stone Sweet differentiates between two
main systems of appointment: nomination by an individual authority
or election, typically by supermajority, in a legislative assembly.59
Systems requiring supermajorities in legislative assemblies were, in
principle, designed to avoid excessively partisan appointments, but in
practice, they often function like quota systems in which each party
appoints a number of judges ‘roughly proportionate to relative
parliamentary strength’.60 A likely outcome of this system is the
57 Talking about this aspect and about the general intertwining of constitutional courts with politics,
Victor Ferreres calls these institutions as ‘fragile’. Comella, supra note 25, pp. 1705–1736.
58 V Ferreres Comella, ‘The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation: Toward
Decentralization?’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2(3) (2004): pp. 461–491, 468.
59 Stone Sweet, supra note 10, p. 88.
60 Ibid., p. 88. See also Garoupa, supra note 9, p. 30; Tom Ginsburg, ‘Economic Analysis and the
Design of Constitutional Courts’, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 3(1) (2002): pp. 49–85, 68.
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appointment of ideologically like-minded constitutional judges in a
context in which the empirical evidence that the ideology of judges
plays a role in their process of decision making is overwhelming.61
As argued by Garoupa, ‘Constitutional judges are appointed by
heavily politicized bodies and could be heavily influenced by political
parties when these play an active role in the appointment process.
Therefore, judicial independence becomes an issue’, even if consti-
tutional judges have an interest in maintaining some distance from
party politics to protect the prestige of the court.62
The skepticism about constitutional interpretation inherent in the
findings of the empirical literature on constitutional courts must
however be subject to at least two caveats. First, this skepticism does
not prejudge the questions of whether constitutions actually provide
for ‘right answers’ to the cases or for ‘reasons for action’, to borrow
the concepts used inter alia by Dworkin and Greenberg.63 Rather, it
means that, regardless of the reasons for the action provided by the
constitution, constitutional judges have an incentive to decide cases
on political rather than constitutional grounds. This points to a
serious flaw of institutional design in current constitutional courts.
Second, our empirical knowledge of constitutional judges’ decision
making does not suggest that constitutional courts are totally subject
to the preferences of political actors: constitutional judges do pre-
serve agency and autonomy, and their behavior cannot be explained
solely with reference to the preferences of their appointers. How-
ever, that said, the type of deference to politicians inherent to the
hegemonic system of appointment of constitutional judges has as a
side effect, a relative loss of institutional independence. In this re-
gard, current constitutional courts can continue to be deemed rela-
tively dependent vis-à-vis politicians. The corollary of this weakened
judicial independence is frequently a correlative loss of reputation
and sociological legitimacy for the court.
61 Dyevre, supra note 10, pp. 41 ff.
62 Garoupa, supra note 60, p. 29.
63 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘No Right Answer?’, New York University Law Review 53(1) (1978): pp. 1–32:
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London, UK: Bloomsbury, 1997); Mark Greenberg, ‘Moral
Concepts and Motivation’, Philosophical Perspectives 23(1) (2009): pp. 137–164; Mark Greenberg, ‘Im-
plications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II’, Law and
Philosophy 30(4) (2011): pp. 453–476.
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IV. STRIKING A NEW BALANCE: THE CASE FOR LESS POWERFUL
BUT MORE INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
In his piece on constitutional review, Kyritsis argued that ‘constitu-
tional design can choose from among a number of institutional
options and experiment with variables such as the scope and
intensity of review’.64 In this section, I apply that idea to Kelsenian
institutions with the hope of achieving a better balance between the
conflicting values that constitutional courts ought to maximize
simultaneously. To do so, I first explore the possibilities of institu-
tionalizing deference to the legislature through changes in Kelsenian
courts’ benchmarks for review and internal procedures of decision
making. Second, I explore institutional alternatives to current polit-
ical forms of appointment of constitutional judges and other aspects
of court design with a view to fostering judicial independence and
increasing the technocratic legitimacy of these institutions. As I argue
below, these two aspects are not unrelated. In contrast, they are
complementary and only make sense if implemented simultane-
ously.
A. Constraining Courts’ Powers of Review
The first element of my proposal deals with the idea of constraining
constitutional courts’ capacity to declare the unconstitutionality of
legislation. In general, we can also think of constitutional review as a
continuum. In one extreme of the continuum, we would find the
British system of parliamentary sovereignty, where no court can
strike down primary legislation. In the opposite extreme of the
continuum, we would find models of constitutional review with
widely empowered constitutional courts,65 which are powerful given
the role they play in democratic processes and the extensive
opportunities to strike down legislation that they have. What is
important to keep in mind is that these two grand models are not the
only institutional possibilities available to constitution makers. In-
stead, in this subsection, I will argue that in between them there is a
wide range of intermediate approaches, which can be selected by
64 Kyritsis, supra note 27, p. 299.
65 For the sake of analytical clarity, I am deliberately ignoring here the third possibility: the model of
diffuse or decentralized review.
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playing with courts’ institutional settings along two dimensions: the
breadth of courts’ benchmark for review and courts’ internal deci-
sion-making rules.66 Indeed, these two aspects can interact, offering a
wide range of possible constitutional courts with a more moderate
capacity to declare legislation unconstitutional. Furthermore, the
diverse types of designs to which these institutional settings give rise
provide for different solutions to the problem of the conflicting
values that Kelsenian institutions ought to maximize, although, as I
will argue, some of these options might be risky from the perspective
of the protection of democracy.
With this background, in this section, I explore three potential
ways to embed deference to the legislature into courts’ design. In
line with the general argument of this article, my starting point is the
acknowledgement that each of these three possibilities also faces
unavoidable dilemmas and trade-offs, as each of them maximizes
certain values of Kelsenian courts at the cost of reducing the
weighting of others:
- The first option is to reduce courts’ benchmark for review to only certain aspects of the
constitution. Put simply, the constitutional court could be allowed to invalidate statutes that
contradict certain constitutional provisions but not all provisions of the constitution. Of course,
in choosing which provisions to include, there would be a new trade-off: the more constitutional
provisions that are included in the benchmark for review, the weaker is the institutionalized
deference to elected politicians. Conversely, the inclusion of fewer provisions would maximize
deference to the democratically elected legislature but at the cost of reducing the capacity of the
court to protect certain aspects of the constitution. It is for every political community to make
the, political, choice of which provisions to include based on the specific needs, circumstances
and preferences of their society. However, in any democratic polity, at least all the provisions
that protect human rights and the functioning of democratic institutions (which are often the
majority of the constitution) should be always included.67 Therefore, the protection of
democracy and human rights, the first of the values of constitutional courts, would also be
maximized. For the rest of provisions, a good criterion could be the inclusion of specific and
concrete rules, as they constrain judges to a larger extent and leave less room for activism. More
abstract, vague and general rules and principles could be excluded, as these allow judges’
personal preferences to filter more easily into judicial outcomes.68 Together, these two criteria
provide for an interesting interplay. If seriously taken into account, they mean that the
benchmark for review must always include the catalogue of fundamental rights of every con-
stitution, as well as provisions establishing the separation of powers and rules that are specific in
the regulation of the functioning of democratic organs. Provisions that can, but do not need to be,
included comprise inter alia those stating general principles of the legal system or general, vague
principles about the functioning of the institutions and those establishing federal arrangements
and the economic constitution (except when constitution makers opt for phrasing social and
66 Literature in judicial politics has devoted great attention to how internal rules of decision-making
affect judicial outcomes. Dyevre, supra note 2, pp. 303–304.
67 For a proposal in the line of affording specific protection to rules ‘directly affecting the ‘‘core of
democracy’’’, see Sascha Kneip, Verfassungsgerichte als demokratische Akteure. Der Beitrag des Bundesver-
fassungsgerichts zur Qualität der bundesdeutschen Demokratie (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
2009), p. 311; see also Lübbe-Wolff, supra note 47, 28.
68 On vagueness of rules and judges’ policy preferences, see Dyevre, supra note 10, p. 40.
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economic rights as enforceable fundamental rights). Note that, even if not included in the
benchmark for review, such provisions would have constitutional value as a mandate to political
actors and citizens, although they would not be enforceable by the constitutional court. The
reason for this is simply to give democratically elected actors more freedom with regard to how
such provisions should be interpreted. Finally, in order to provide for legal certainty and to avoid
an expansive interpretation by the constitutional court, the very constitutional document could
specify which provisions are part of the benchmark of review of the court and which are not.
This proposal may seem radical, as it would deny full normativity to certain parts of the
constitution. However, it is less radical than it might seem. First, many constitutions already
establish distinctions between their many provisions, for instance, when they create flexible
procedures of amendment for some rules and rigid procedures for others. Second, this idea is
actually applied in countries that have constitutional systems with an uncontested democratic
pedigree, such as Belgium. In this country the constitutional court can declare legislation
unconstitutional only when it violates certain, but not all, constitutional provisions, inter alia
those relating to fundamental rights or those defining the powers of different state authorities. In
addition, finally, this idea is in fact connected with Kelsen’s original intuitions; he
insisted that constitutional review should only take place with respect to rather specific clauses
of the constitution, for he thought that the final authority to interpret the more abstract clauses
that protect, for example, ‘‘justice,’’ ‘‘liberty,’’ or ‘‘equality’’ should rest with the parliament.69
The fundamental difference between my proposal and Kelsen’s
original approach is that in my approach the catalogue of funda-
mental rights would be protected by the court. Unlike rules on the
functioning of democratic institutions, which are often concrete and
specific, provisions on human rights might be vague and abstract.
Indeed, as Waldron suggests, some of the major issues that a
democratic society faces have to do precisely with disagreements
about the content of the rights.70 I concede that these are powerful
arguments in favor of deference to the legislature as well in this
regard. However, I believe that rights provisions must still be judi-
cially enforceable, together with rules on democratic institutions and
procedures, as part of constitutional review. The reason for this
position is that we can never exclude that, in addition to actors that
disagree about the specific content of rights, our societies may face at
some point actors who are willing to undermine the more general
idea of a culture of rights in a democratic society.71 I am therefore
taking a precautionary approach here. The inclusion of rights as part
of constitutional review implies, in effect, an important ‘delegation
of policy-making authority’72 and therefore an increased risk of
judicial activism. It is the price to pay. After human societies expe-
69 Comella, supra note 58, p. 487.
70 Waldron, supra note 18, p. 1367.
71 I am using here Waldron’s concepts, although to defend a thesis different to his own. See
Waldron, supra note 18, p. 1366 ff.
72 Stone Sweet, supra note 10, p. 90.
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rienced totalitarianism, facing the dilemma between greater protec-
tions of human rights and a more deferential court, the second must
give way.
- The second option to increase constitutional deference to the legislature would consist of
requiring a qualified majority of judges to allow the court to declare legislation unconstitu-
tional.73 This option is notably riskier, as was demonstrated by the recent example of Poland.
For reasons of analytical exhaustivity and as it is relevant to the rest of my discussion in this
section, I will explain this option here. However, as I will argue later, democratic systems should
be very careful when considering this possibility and be fully aware of its inherent problems.
The normative justification for this proposal would lie in the idea
that, if different judges, all of them highly qualified lawyers, largely
disagree with regard to whether the constitution does or does not
forbid the content of a rule, it must be because the constitution does
not contain a clear prohibition, and in the absence of a clear pro-
hibition, the court should be deferent to the legislature.74 This idea
could be deemed somewhat related to the principle of the ‘clear
mistake rule’ that exists in countries without a Kelsenian court, such
as Sweden and Finland. According to this principle, ‘only when the
statute is unconstitutional beyond any reasonable doubt may a court
set it aside for purposes of deciding the case’.75 By requiring a higher
threshold for judges to declare legislation unconstitutional, a form of
the ‘clear mistake rule’ can be embedded into Kelsenian institutions
through the norms of internal decision-making.76 As with the former
possibility, this option institutionalizes deference to the legislature,
but it does it in a very different way. Instead of leaving parts of the
constitution unprotected, the constitutional court can still enforce
the normativity of all constitutional provisions as long as there is
sufficient consensus to do so. Institutionalized constitutional restraint
would be increased but only in case where judges disagree regarding
the constitutionality of a rule.
73 The idea that judicial supermajorities be used, often with the aim of increasing deference towards
political actors, is not new. See for discussions on the issue Evan Caminker, ‘Thayerian Deference to
Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past’, Indiana Law Journal 78(1)
(2003): pp. 73–122; Jonathan L Entin, ‘Judicial Supermajorities and the Validity of Statutes: How Mapp
Became a Fourth Amendment Landmark Instead of a First Amendment Footnote’, Case Western Reserve
Law Review 52(2) (2001): pp. 441–470; Renate Jaeger, ‘Nach der Reform ist vor der Reform’, in Andreas
Zimmermann (eds.), 60 Jahre Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention – die Konvention als ‘Living Instrument’
(Berlin: BWV-Verlag, 2014), pp. 125–131; see also Lübbe-Wolff, supra note 47, p 26.
74 See also Caminker, supra note 73, pp. 94–96.
75 Comella, supra note 58, p. 462.
76 See a similar approach in Caminker, supra note 73, pp. 94 ff.
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As was said above, however, this option presents three very
serious problems. The first is that, again, institutional design must
confront dilemmas. In this solution, the price to pay for this in-
creased form of deference to the legislature is a weakening of an-
other important value of Kelsenian institutions: its capacity to
protect democracy and human rights. As it will be more difficult for
the court to strike down legislation, undemocratic and illiberal re-
forms might find less resistance from the court. Second, when the
threshold to declare legislation unconstitutional is too high, the court
might become paralyzed. Disagreement and the plurality of doctrinal
opinions is inherent in judicial decision making; therefore, if the
judicial consensus required is very high, the court will struggle to
actually ever declare the unconstitutionality of legislation. Third, if
this model is coupled with political control of the appointment of
constitutional judges, the result might be fatal because it will be easy
for political majorities to create a veto minority within the court. In
fact, as I show in more detail later in this article, the case of Poland is
a perfect example of how these three risks can materialize simulta-
neously, with dramatic consequences. Given these important risks,
in what remains of this article, when I discuss my proposal for a new
design of constitutional courts, I will be referring to the first option
outlined above, or the third option explained just below, and not to
this second model, unless I make a specific reference to it.
- A third option is a mix of the two former possibilities. It would entail establishing two different
groups of constitutional provisions, as in the first option. But similar to the second option, all
constitutional provisions could be enforced if a sufficient consensus is reached among the judges.
Core constitutional provisions, such as those regulating human rights and democratic institu-
tions and procedures, could be enforced and used to declare the unconstitutionality of legislation
as long as a simple majority of judges considered it necessary. However, for the rest of the
constitutional provisions, a higher threshold might be required. This way, the institutional
design would take a precautionary approach to the core democratic values and arrangements
and a more deferential approach towards democratically elected actors with regard to the rest of
the constitutional provisions. This option therefore offers a different mix of the three values that
I have discussed throughout this article, and it confronts the dilemmas of constitutional courts in
a different way: compared to most current Kelsenian institutions, this option does not reduce
courts’ capacity to defend democracy and human rights, and it only slightly weakens their
capacity to protect nonessential constitutional provisions. However, in exchange, this type of
constitutional court is much less deferential to democratically elected politicians than the two
options outlined above, although it is still slightly more deferential than most existing consti-
tutional courts.
Outlined in this way, the proposal aimed at increasing constitu-
tional courts’ deference to the legislature would be, in fact, modest
and symbolic. However, these two qualities are an asset rather than
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a problem from the perspective of improving the design of consti-
tutional courts.
The reform proposed would be quantitatively modest because it
will in fact not significantly alter the everyday work of constitutional
courts. This is true, first, because it only affects one of the functions
of constitutional courts: constitutional review of legislation. Other
functions, such as the adjudication of constitutional complaints or
the mediation between organs or levels of government, do not need
to be modified, even if, as suggested above, the proposal is not a
priori incompatible with certain such modifications. More impor-
tantly, with regard to the review of the constitutionality of legisla-
tion, the aspects of the constitution excluded from review or subject
to a higher voting threshold in the court are in fact a minority of
provisions. The greatest majority of provisions in every constitution
refer to fundamental rights or regulate the functioning of democratic
institutions. Only for those constitutions that have a significant
proportion of provisions proclaiming general and vague principles or
rules unrelated to democracy and human rights would the proposal
make a significant quantitative impact. Furthermore, when a law is
brought for constitutional review before the court, it is usually on a
mix of grounds that combine constitutional provisions that are both
essential and nonessential for democracy. Therefore, in fact, the
changes brought about in constitutional courts are very limited. The
proposal is not for a revolution but rather for a modest reform. This
is a good thing if we think about the fundamental importance of
constitutional courts and the fact that gradual changes are less risky
to implement. More importantly, the quantitative modesty of the
reform clarifies an essential point: my proposal for a new design of
constitutional courts is not about a more flexible or ‘weak’ consti-
tutional review. In contrast, it advocates for the maximum possible
deference to the legislature that is compatible with a strong protection
of rights and democracy through constitutional review by a more
independent court. In fact, nothing prevents constitution makers
from enlarging the catalogue of rights in the constitution as a
complement to the implementation of this type of court. Given the
analytical complexity of the topic, I cannot here enter into a dis-
cussion of the political or moral merits of this latter option.
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In addition to this quantitative modesty, however, the proposed
reform would be qualitatively ambitious because it would affect very
limited but yet very meaningful aspects of the constitution. It would
affect mostly principles –as opposed to rules, that are vague, inde-
terminate and thus more prone to interpretative controversies and
allegations of activism and judicial politicization. It would also affect
provisions that are not essential for democracy, covering topics that
democratically elected politicians should have a prominent role in
regulating. By carrying out this reform, the political branches of
government and the public will receive a signal that the constitu-
tional court can no longer be accused of activism but without
actually disempowering the court in its ability to carry out the
functions that truly matter. Instead, as we will see below, disem-
powering constitutional courts with regard to aspects of the consti-
tution that are not essential for democracy can –and should,
empower it to enforce the constitutional rules on which the func-
tioning of democracy actually relies.
In summary, my claim is that this quantitatively modest but
qualitatively ambitious change in the design of constitutional courts
will alleviate concerns about excessive judicial activism and will in-
crease deference to the legislature. Against this claim, the objection
could be made that constitutional courts will still be enforcing hu-
man rights provisions. Since constitutional provisions protecting
human rights are characterized by a high degree of generality and
indeterminacy and by an expansive nature, their enforcement opens
the door to judicial activism and the possibility of countermajori-
tarian decisions. This objection can be partially conceded without
refuting the central claims of this article. Remember that the pro-
posal in this article is not for constitutional courts to be unable to
make countermajoritarian decisions. Rather, as was said above, the
proposal is for an increase in constitutional courts’ deference to the
legislature that is compatible with a strong protection of democracy
and human rights. In the model that I propose, constitutional courts
will still have opportunities to engage in countermajoritarian deci-
sions. This is politically healthy given that these courts will do so
when core elements of the democratic system of government are at
stake. However, constitutional courts under this new design will still
be more deferential to the democratically elected legislature because
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they will be less able to use general principles or rules that are
nonessential to democracy in order to strike down legislation. That
is, the catalogue of provisions that they would be able to mobilize to
review the constitutionality of legislation will be more limited, even
if it is still large enough to be active in the defense of democracy and
human rights.
B. More Independent Courts
The second aspect of the proposal to constraint constitutional courts’
powers of review has to do with the need to, simultaneously, make
them more independent from political actors. The appointment
procedures of constitutional judges play a central role in this.
In general, forms of the appointment of members of constitu-
tional courts have tried to combine two forms of legitimacy. On the
one hand, constitutional judges are generally expected to be lawyers
with a solid reputation and high moral character who are capable of
making sophisticated decisions following the best knowledge of the
law. This is a clearly technocratic form of legitimacy. On the other
hand, however, constitutional judges are usually appointed by
political actors, which, in theory, should bestow on them with a
modicum of democratic legitimacy. This is, conversely, a political
form of legitimacy. The problem is that, in practice, these two forms
of legitimacy are often in tension. Earlier in this article, we saw that,
when confronted with the dilemma of whether members of the
constitutional court should be appointed by the parliament or by the
administration, Kelsen opted for the first option as a means to pro-
tect democracy. However, we also saw that parliamentary
appointment, which has become the standard practice, often means a
degree of political control over Kelsenian institutions that under-
mines their reputation as independent courts. As was shown by the
empirical literature,77 such practices often lead to a filtering of
political preferences into judicial decision making, which is at odds
with strict conceptions of judicial independence and the idea of
constitutional courts as unbiased constitutional adjudicators. In this
77 See Sofia Amaral-Garcia, Nuno Garoupa and Veronica Grembi, ‘Judicial Independence and Party
Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal’, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
6(2) (2009): pp. 381–404; Nuno Garoupa, Fernando Gomez-Pomar and Veronica Grembi, ‘Judging
Under Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Con-
stitutional Court’, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 29(3) (2013): pp. 513–534.
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subsection, I argue that judicial appointments to the constitutional
court should move away from democratic legitimacy (and definitely
avoid partisan appointments or quota systems) and focus on tech-
nocratic legitimacy in order to preserve their reputation as inde-
pendent, neutral enforcers of the constitution or, even more
importantly, impartial defenders of democracy.
The shift towards the technocratic legitimacy of constitutional
judges would be facilitated by the general reform of constitutional
courts proposed by this article. In exchange for an increase in con-
stitutional courts’ deference towards democratically elected politi-
cians, which I described above, these institutions can be
compensated through an increase in their independence vis-à-vis
those politicians. By circumscribing constitutional courts’ powers to
defend basic democratic arrangements and human rights, the con-
cern about judicial activism is alleviated. Constitutional courts will
now be less likely to engage in activist countermajoritarian decisions.
However, they will not do so because they are subject to a dele-
gitimizing and often ineffective control by political actors. Rather,
the minimization of potential activism will be embedded in courts’
mandates and the rules that regulate the internal functioning of the
institution. With constitutional courts now less likely to engage in
battles about issues of general policy and more focused instead on
the protection of core democratic arrangements, politicians will have
less to fear from them. These courts can now be emancipated from
political control, while minimizing politicians’ concerns that they
will make a fraudulent use of their newly gained freedom in order to
impose their own policy preferences at the expenses of the demo-
cratic will.
The range of institutional reforms that potentially can be used to
minimize political control over constitutional courts is relatively
vast, although, unfortunately, there is still much at the empirical
level that we ignore about the effectiveness of many of those
arrangements.78 In fact, Kelsen himself thought at some point about
some alternatives to the parliamentary appointment of constitutional
judges.79 A good starting point would be to replace, where they
78 About the level of development of empirical literature on constitutional courts, see Garoupa, supra
note 60, pp. 27–28. See also Dyevre, supra note 10, p. 31.
79 See Lars Vinx, The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of
Constitutional Law (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 48.
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exist, simple and absolute majorities for the appointment of such
constitutional judges with supermajorities. However, as was said
above, supermajorities have often proved insufficient due to the
creation of political ‘quota systems’. To overcome this, a solution
would be the combination of the system of supermajorities of
members of the legislative chambers with a requirement that a
qualified majority of parliamentary groups accept the appointment:
this way, big political groups that can add up supermajorities of MPs
would have to include in their agreements political minorities,
making quotas less straightforward. Another option would be the
granting to parliamentary minorities of certain types of veto rights
on the candidates proposed by majorities, thus making more
politicized candidates less likely to be appointed.
All these arrangements, however, still put the appointment of
judges in the hands of political actors. They still move within Kel-
sen’s dilemma between parliamentary versus administrative
appointment,80 opting for sophisticated forms of the first option.
However, for once, there are ways out of this institutional dilemma.
It is possible to imagine alternatives beyond these two options.
Braver proposals would release partially or completely the appoint-
ment of judges from the hands of politicians from both the executive
and the legislative branches. The appointment of constitutional court
members could be bestowed upon ordinary judges or even official
organizations of certain legal professions.81 In general, the appoint-
ment of constitutional judges by bodies that have an institutional
ethos that is deeply linked to the ideas of human rights and the rule
of law can reinforce the independence of the institution vis-à-vis
politicians, its reputation and its technocratic legitimacy. When
correctly socialized, legal professionals or career judges can be ideal
for this task. While it is important to acknowledge the risk that these
actors or bodies may have their own ideological biases, the different
forms of institutionalized deference to the legislature should reduce
the problems this poses, albeit not completely annul them. Again,
designing institutions means choosing among imperfect options.
Additionally, the appointment of different constitutional judges by
different methods and combinations of actors from legal and political
80 Kelsen, supra note 5, p. 187.
81 See in this regard Ginsburg, supra note 60, pp. 66–67.
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backgrounds, and the introduction of veto rights and supermajorities
in appointments, can also help further minimize such problems. A
final idea has to do less with the type of appointer than with the
criteria for appointment: difficult as this might be, systems of
appointment that include objective and independent assessments of
the technical merits of the candidates would also help to increase the
technocratic legitimacy of constitutional judges and to minimize
politicization in appointments.
All these proposals should increase the technocratic legitimacy of
constitutional courts while reducing political control of the institu-
tions. Of course, the risk in this case arises when and if political
actors find new ways to repoliticize the new technocratic systems of
appointment of constitutional judges. For instance, political actors
could accept bestowing upon ordinary judges the appointment of
some constitutional judges but only after securing control over those
very ordinary judges. Maneuvers such as this would be, of course,
contrary to the overall telos of the reform proposed by this article. In
the next section, I will approach this type of questions in more detail,
addressing the institutional design of constitutional courts from a
configurational perspective. However, for now, suffice it to say that
implementing reforms in constitutional courts is a delicate operation.
Reforms to increase the independence of constitutional courts might
be devoid of real content and might even become counterproductive
if the source of the politization of the institution is displaced to other
aspects of their design rather than suppressed.
The mechanisms for the appointment of constitutional judges are,
however, not the only aspect of institutional design deserving of
reform. Other reforms to strengthen judicial independence could
include the prohibition of the renewability of judges where this
exists, the granting of life tenure to them, or the selection of them
exclusively from among members of the judicial branch. For in-
stance, limited terms for constitutional judges, which is deemed to
be detrimental to judicial independence,82 is sometimes justified as a
mechanism to ‘reduce the risk of a serious gap between the consti-
tutional jurisprudence of the court and the basic moral and political
beliefs of the people and their elected representatives’.83 However, in
82 Garoupa, supra note 60, pp. 29–30. Ginsburg, supra note 60, p. 65.
83 Comella, supra note 58, p. 468.
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the model of constitutional court proposed by this article, this would
be less necessary because deference to democratically elected
politicians is institutionalized through the courts’ benchmarks for
review and the rules of judicial decision making rather than in the
procedures of judicial appointment, thus also safeguarding judicial
independence. Under this institutional setting, and as long as parti-
sanship has been completely removed from the appointments,
constitutional judges with life tenure might make much more sense.
In general, the implementation of reforms aimed at the depoliti-
cization of appointments and the granting of more independence to
constitutional judges is both facilitated and demanded by this type of
court.
The idea behind the proposal for a new design for constitutional
courts can now be seen more clearly. The proposal aims at striking a
better balance among the three values of constitutional courts. By
transforming the appointment procedure, constitutional judges are
emancipated from political control, thus maximizing judicial inde-
pendence. In exchange, and to avoid the excessive activism this
might cause, constitutional restraint is institutionalized in the inter-
nal rules of the functioning of the court but only for policy issues
that are not essential to the functioning of a democracy and without
having to subject constitutional judges to political control, as in the
traditional model. Core democratic arrangements and human rights
will still receive the protection of the constitutional court, which will
now be more independent from politicians in carrying out this
important function.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND THE CONFIGURATIONAL NATURE
OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
After proposing institutional reforms, in this section, I would like to
emphasize how constitutional courts are systems in equilibrium. By
this, I mean that their performance depends on the interaction be-
tween the different aspects of their design and between these and
their sociopolitical context. As Kyritsis notes, ‘constitutional review
in a democratic regime is not decided in an all or nothing fashion,
but is rather a matter of fine-grained, context specific institutional
balances and adjustments’.84 One element of institutional design that
84 Kyritsis, supra note 27, p. 299.
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can be useful in a certain constitutional court can be dysfunctional
for another Kelsenian court with a different setting. A type of con-
stitutional court that performs well in a certain type of constitutional
context or sociopolitical environment might underperform in a dif-
ferent one. Constitutional courts are configurations of elements in
which all aspects of the design of the institution interact with each
other and with the context in which they are embedded, so a small
change in one element might lead to different results for the insti-
tution as a whole. With this in mind, I will review three aspects for
which this configurational nature is particularly relevant.
First, the interaction between the two dimensions of institutional
design in which this article focuses is very important, as has already
been suggested. Having constitutional courts with more restricted
powers to declare the unconstitutionality of legislation only makes
sense if we simultaneously make them more politically independent,
and vice versa. A court with more restricted powers of review that
continues to be under the control of politicians will probably be
ineffective as a countermajoritarian institution. This could poten-
tially affect its performance in regard to the important function of
protecting democracy and human rights. The next section provides
some examples of this. An independent court emancipated from
political control, which continues to be very powerful because
constitutional restraint has not been institutionalized, risks becoming
an activist institution. It is likely that we would see such a court often
striking down democratically legitimized policy choices based on
judges’ constitutional interpretations or even political preferences,
and in the long run, this could undermine the very legitimacy of the
court. In my view, both of these two options achieve a suboptimal
balance of constitutional courts’ three values.
Second, the two elements of institutional design on which I have
focused interact with other aspects of Kelsenian courts that this
article has deliberately left aside. Constitutional courts perform other
functions in addition to the review of legislation. They often receive
constitutional complaints in defense of fundamental rights or
mediate between levels or branches of government. Therefore, any
reform would have to assess how the type of Kelsenian court pro-
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posed by this article, and its specific institutional setting, interacts
with these other functions and with the way in which they are
regulated in each specific court. Furthermore, the very technicalities of
the implementation of the proposal for a new design of constitutional
court will involve a number of important procedural and logistical
choices whose consequences deserve careful consideration.85
Third, all the elements of institutional design interact with the
wider political and social context of constitutional courts. Let me
focus on the idea of providing legal professionals with powers over
the appointment of constitutional judges. As I suggested above, this
idea is scarcely useful if these actors or institutions are subject to
political control themselves. For instance, in Spain, two members of
the constitutional court are appointed by the Council of the Judi-
ciary. However, the members of this organ happen to be appointed
by the parliament. Giving nonpolitical actors, such as a judicial
council, control over the members of the constitutional court might
be less efficient or even counterproductive if these actors are actually
themselves subject to political control. Another good example are
countries in transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy. In
these countries, the new democratic political elites often coexist with
institutions packed with individuals loyal to the former regime. Such
institutions might include organizations of legal professionals or even
the judiciary. For obvious reasons, giving these actors control over
the appointment of the judges who will be entrusted with the pro-
tection democratic arrangements and human rights would be a
counterproductive idea.86 These types of sociopolitical, context-
specific considerations should always be taken into account with
regard to all other aspects of the design of constitutional courts.
VI. ILLIBERALISM AND THE CASE FOR A NEW DESIGN
OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
Before concluding, I would like to devote some final words to the
problem of illiberal populism and its relationship with constitutional
courts. To do so, I will focus on the current governments of Poland
and Hungary, as both have carried out disquieting reforms of these
85 Caminker, supra note 73, p. 78.
86 See, in this regard, the interesting comment by Comella, supra note 58, p. 469. See also Garoupa,
supra note 60, p. 31.
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institutions and have done so despite their membership in the
European Union and their location in a region where a more func-
tional version of the Kelsenian model seemed to be consolidated.
The theoretical framework provided by this article can be particu-
larly useful to understand the type of constitutional courts that these
governments have aimed at creating and to analyze the problems
associated with them.
In Poland, the attack on the constitutional court was operated,
specifically, by means of political control and paralysis. In 2015,
under a new legislation, the Civic Platform party majority in par-
liament appointed five new constitutional judges to replace those
whose terms would expire that year. Among those five judges, there
were two whose terms were to expire after a new parliament was
elected.87 After new elections took place, the Law and Justice party
(PiS), now with a majority of seats, refused to swear in the five
judges appointed by the previous parliament and appointed five new
judges to the court.88 Furthermore, Law and Justice passed a law
requiring a two-thirds majority of judges for any court decision to be
binding and raising the quorum for hearing a case from nine to
thirteen in a context in which there were only twelve judges on the
tribunal.89 Earlier in this article, I warned against the risks of
supermajorities in judicial decision making, especially if these are too
high. However, the disempowerment of the Polish Constitutional
Court cannot be blamed only on this aspect but rather on its cou-
pling with the PiS-controlled appointment of new judges and the
composition of the court. As was suggested above, the functioning of
a constitutional court is the result of how different aspects of its
design interact. Indeed, it is often in the interaction of certain fea-
tures that specific elements of the institutional design of a court
become particularly dysfunctional. The assault on the Polish court
was complemented by the requirement that cases remain on the
docket for at least six months before they can be decided and the
87 Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, ‘Of institutions, Democracy, Constitutional Self-Defence and the
Rule of Law: The Judgments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in Cases K 34/15, K 35/15 and
Beyond’, Common Market Law Review 53(6) (2016): pp. 1753–1792, 1755.
88 Bojan Bugarič and Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Assault on Postcommunist Courts’, Journal of Democracy
27(3) (2016): pp. 69–82, 73.
89 Ibid., p. 73.
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granting of powers to the parliament to terminate a judge’s man-
date.90 The result is a dysfunctional court and a constitutional crisis
in Poland with European-level implications.
The case of Hungary is probably even more complex. Using its
parliamentary supermajority, Orbán’s government changed the rules
for the constitutional court so that the appointment of judges re-
quired a two-thirds majority in the legislature.91 In principle, this is in
line with the standards of other European democracies. The problem
is that, unlike in functional democracies, Orbán’s party Fidesz had, at
that time, a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, so it could control
the appointments. This illustrates two ideas that have been put
forward earlier in this article. First, the system of parliamentary
appointment, even when supermajorities are required, might be
insufficient to ensure the independence of the court. Second, the
elements of the institutional design of a court interact with its wider
political environment: a requirement for a parliamentary superma-
jority might be futile in a context of party hegemony.
Orbán’s control over the constitutional court was furthered by a
bolder move: the number of constitutional judges was increased
from eight to fifteen so that Orbán could fill the new positions with
his candidates.92 At this point, judicial independence had been se-
verely weakened, and political control over the court was secured.
At the same time, Orbán’s government tried to limit the power of
the constitutional court. Fidesz deprived the court of authority over
fiscal matters,93 and the system of ‘actio popularis’ was replaced by a
more limited model of ‘constitutional complaint’.94 In 2013, the Basic
Law was again amended so that the pre-2012 case law of the Con-
stitutional Court would no longer have legal effect,95 and the court
could no longer review constitutional amendments on substantive
grounds.96 The result is a weakening of the capacity of the court to
protect democracy and human rights in Hungary at a time when
such a capacity would be most crucial. As was argued by Bugaric and
90 Ibid., pp. 73–74.
91 Bojan Bugaric, Protecting Democracy and the Rule of Law in the European Union: The Hun-
garian Challenge, LSE ‘Europea in Question’ Discussion Papers 79/2014, 2014, 9.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., p. 10.
95 Ibid., p. 12.
96 Ibid., p. 13.
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Ginsburg after the reforms, ‘Hungary’s once-powerful and highly
respected Constitutional Court has effectively disappeared from the
political scene’.97
The model of constitutional court that is defended in this article
seeks to increase deference to democratically elected politicians
while simultaneously increasing courts’ independence from those
politicians and while shielding the court’s power to protect democ-
racy and human rights. In contrast, the illiberal governments of
Poland and Hungary have opted for a model of politically-dependent
and disempowered constitutional courts. Rather than deference,
these courts are designed to show submission to ruling majorities,
they lack judicial independence, and their capacity to protect
democracy and human rights in their countries, instead of being
protected, is deliberately weakened. There are powerful arguments
based on general democratic theory as to why the reforms of con-
stitutional courts carried out by these governments should be re-
jected. However, the theoretical framework of this article offers one
additional compelling reason to do so: given their design, these
courts are unable to properly provide for any of the three values that
legitimize these institutions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
I believe the proposal for a new type of constitutional court sug-
gested in these pages still moves within the family of neo-constitu-
tional forms of constitutional review. However, it is very likely that
the proposal is as close to the ideal point of political constitutionalists
as is conceptually possible within the range of neo-constitutional
options. The reason is that the proposal not only acknowledges the
importance of deference to democratically elected actors but also
tries to embed it into the institutional design of courts. If the ‘new
Commonwealth model of constitutionalism’98 proposes judicial re-
view without judicial supremacy, the proposal for a new model of
constitutional courts is about accepting judicial supremacy but
restricting it only to the protection of core democratic arrangements.
97 Bugarič and Ginsburg, supra note 88, p. 73.
98 Gardbaum, supra note 13.
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While I believe that the capacity of this proposal to increase
deference to the democratic legislator is positive, I assume it will
often be met with skepticism. Conservatives will dislike it when
progressive majorities can implement their policy choices with
slightly fewer constraints. Left-wing voters will feel frustrated when
a right-wing government passes legislation while facing a reduced
veto threat, and vice versa. However, at the end of the day, this is
simply what deference to the democratically elected legislature looks
like. My aim was to achieve this deference while increasing judicial
independence and preserving or improving what I consider to be the
most precious value of postwar constitutional courts: their capacity
to protect democracy and human rights.
In a world increasingly populated by illiberals and populists, the
idea of increased and embedded deference to a legislature that could
one day be dominated by these actors might be disquieting. How-
ever, my proposal for a new type of constitutional court is designed
to ensure that illiberal policy choices are deactivated, as democracy
and human rights should actually receive reinforced protection from
a more independent court. In fact, increased judicial independence
might be the best insurance against an eventual illiberal majority in
parliament. This article’s proposal for a new design for constitutional
courts seeks to fine-tune mechanisms of checks and balances. While
it can soften the countermajoritarian character of constitutional
courts vis-à-vis nonessential aspects of the constitution, at the core of
the proposal is the reinforcement of such a countermajoritarian
character with regard to the fundamental structural elements of a
liberal polity. In fact, if the proposal manages, as I hope it would, to
improve the functioning of constitutional courts, to defend their
reputation and to protect their sociological legitimacy, it could help
to counter some of the discourses of illiberal populists who often
exploit the dysfunctions of liberal institutions for their own benefit.
Finally, the proposal for a new design of constitutional courts
advanced by this article is moderately ambitious but also prudent
with regard to its prospects for implementation. I do not suggest that
all countries with Kelsenian institutions should now rush to reform
them along the lines recommended by this article. In fact, in places
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where constitutional courts are prestigious, functional and efficient,
maintaining them the way they are might often be the best option.
The proposal, however, might be considered in countries where the
constitutional court has serious reputational problems. It might also
be an option in countries where no system of constitutional review
exists at all, as opponents of this arrangement will probably feel less
uncomfortable with this variety of constitutional court. In addition,
the proposal would definitely be a step forward in countries where
the constitutional court has been disempowered by illiberal or
authoritarian governments. My proposal for a new model of con-
stitutional courts should be deemed one more legitimate option in
the menu of democratic institutions and should picked when it is
considered to best fit the political needs of a country.
Challenging the hegemonic contemporary approach to the design
of constitutional courts, this article has proposed far-reaching, and
possibly controversial, reforms to the structure of these institutions.
It has done so by acknowledging that constitutional courts face
insurmountable dilemmas that we can accommodate but not over-
come. The article has made some of those dilemmas explicit and has
explored them from a theoretical perspective. In so doing, I hope
that, in addition to my proposal for reform, I have provided col-
leagues and policy makers with a useful framework for general
reflection on constitutional courts. While a healthy approach to
these institutions should acknowledge that, in the view of the
structural trade-offs they face, perfect designs will probably never
exist, the endeavor to improve these designs is still possible and
should emphatically be advanced.
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